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Abstract 
In this thesis I will argue that Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenology of givenness, 
far from being a masked theology, arises from and remains consistent with the 
fundamental principles of phenomenology traditionally conceived. In support of 
this position, I will assess his principal phenomenological work, Being Given. 
I will show that Marion's conception of the saturated phenomenon, reduced to 
its own occurrence as an excess of effects over every nexus of causes, takes 
Husserl's contention that givenness determines phenomenality to its logical 
conclusion. What is seen is thus sprung from this unseen self-givenness. This 
is most plainly experienced in the realms of art and gift giving. Bearing this 
in mind, and with an eye to establishing its historical antecedents, I will 
show how such saturated phenomena, quite apart from being of theological 
origin, have their roots in Immanuel Kant's treatment of art, and, more 
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.PennyJ-Porrhs -An Inrroducrion 
Phenomenology, as "a space of possible truths", wherein possibility is higher than 
actuality, has experienced no small difficulty in opening itself to those entwined in a 
string ofpost-Levinasian thinkers, which, in their own respective ways, emphasize an 
excess, be it in the form of a phenomenon, an Other, or an auto-affection, that compels 
one to participate in a relation that is incommensurable with a power exercised, with a 
possession, or a knowledge on the part of man as subject (Janicaud 2000, 94-95). Levinas 
begins this movement in taking it upon himself to point toward the face of the Other, the 
Other in its radical alterity, which, with its counter-intentionality, calls the egoism of the 
subject into question and alerts him to a hunger which is not bent on concupiscence 
(Levinas 1969, 34). Later, Michel Henry will insist that life has no face, that it consists in 
a radical immediacy that admits no space of light through which it might see itself. 
Instead, the self undergoes and frrst experiences itself as an immediate affectation of itself 
by itself (Henry 2009, 72, 122). Levinas and Henry serve as but two leading examples of 
this ongoing tradition. The point is that before giving due consideration to these and 
other emerging possibilities, certain adherents, Dominique J anicaud among them, have 
rested content in simply siphoning them away, storing them safely under that daunting, 
some might even say dubious term, 'theology'. 
But this view, consisting as it does of theoretical prejudices and groundless fears 
clothed in the robes of 'common sense', can itself have no place in phenomenology, 
which, as we will see, stands apart from the 'natural attitude', and so we here will seek to 
move beyond it. We will argue that Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenology of givenness, 
though not without its alterations and advancements upon Edmund Husserl's 
phenomenological project, is founded within and remains consistent with the fundamental 
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principles of phenomenology traditionally conceived. 
With this having been said, introductions are in order: Marion, first and foremost, 
was a pupil of Jacques Derrida. The debate over the nature of the gift and its manner of 
being given which arose out of the two will stand as an important point here, and we will 
primarily explore it through the latter's work, Given Time, and the former's, Being Given. 
Though Being Given is indeed a strictly phenomenological work, with a strong basis in 
Husser! and Heidegger, let us not go without noting that Marion is also a known Catholic, 
and has several works of a decidedly theological nature to his name, perhaps none more 
influential than God Without Being, wherein he explores God as making a gift of Himself, 
as a pure gift, in that sense, made outside the horizon ofbeingness. 
In any event, with this background in place, the train of our thought will run as 
follows: the opening chapter of our project begins with a brieflook into the reduction as 
put forward by Husser!; and will continue through an assessment of Martin Heidegger's 
variation thereof. Following this, we will introduce Marion's third reduction to givenness, 
which reveals givenness to be the essential factor in any phenomenon's achieving 
phenomenality. Before exploring the effects of this reduction, we will address the 
primary objections to it, as put forward by Dominique Janicaud. These objections 
properly addressed, we will move into a discussion of the painting as a phenomenon in 
which the givenness of the given most plainly unfolds. 
Our sights then shift toward an explication of Marion's conception of the gift as the 
model of givenness. In keeping with the logic of the gift, whereby that which is given 
gives itself from itself, as we will see, the most common-place of phenomena similarly 
initiate their own apparition, without exterior condition or horizon, and in excess of 
expectation, thereby privileging the self with the function of reception rather than 
constitution. Here Marion's position that the self accesses itself through inauthenticity 
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rather than authenticity reveals itself in origin and significance: as fundamentally gifted, 
the self can never recuperate itself on the level of knowledge or possession; its activity 
instead consists in continuing to extend outside itself, to be lost for any definite self-
knowledge and thus give itself, without any sense of mineness. Instead of a pure loss, 
though, in outlining this position ofMarion's, we will reveal this giving in abandon as a 
victory over and above the contentment of simply being and appropriating oneself. 
Janicaud again makes his presence felt here, questioning the need for this move 
outside the horizon of objectness and beingness in order to be receptive to phenomena 
come from elsewhere. In the eyes of J anicaud, Descartes' conception of the idea of 
infinity reveals that the subject exists beyond the representation it can have of itself. But 
does the certainty afforded the subject that is the end result of this schema provide the self 
with an assurance adequate to its nature? In order to overcome pangs of indifference, an 
attitude by no means uncommon today, in whose rumblings one hears the question, "why 
bother?", we will, in a defense of Marion, explore the possibility that, in order to retain 
the assurance proper to it, the self needs expose itself to the radical alterity of the Other, 
or what Marion regards as a "love without being" (Marion, 2003: 72). The saturated 
phenomenon will then come upon us, and we will seek to outline and clarify Marion's 
assessment of its call, and how it provides us with an inkling for the role of revelation in 
phenomenology proper. 
vi 
].1- Reflection and Care 
We begin with Husser I. The transcendental reduction put forward by Husserl does 
not annul but shifts focus away from the world as undoubted datum and the vagaries of 
vocation -- personal interests, desires, prejudices, etc -- through which we relate to it. 
This natural attitude becomes so many sunken embers against the light of transcendental 
subjectivity, wherein the actuality of the world is suspended in view of an assessment of 
the world's primordial modes of givenness. Here, in the eyes ofHusserl, objects are 
alighted upon as essentially given for the ego's cognitive and sense-bestowing activity. 
The transcendental reduction thus accomplishes a neutralization on account of which the 
pure dimension of the world, the world considered in its being-meant rather than its actual 
being, is revealed in its essential meaning-formations, as an abstract, nominal structure 
which correlates with that of absolute consciousness (Husserl 1960,37, 75). 
In view of apodicity, outside prejudice and practical attitudes, Husserl calls for an 
eidetic variation which, as a free imaginative play, enables one to accede to "the general 
style which this intuitive world, in the flow of total experience, persistently maintains" 
(Husserl 1970a, 31 ). With this shift from subjective particularities to the primordial 
structure of constitution, Husserl moves back toward a fundamental passivity, toward a 
receptivity, whereby an anonymous, absolute ego is informed by a strata of sense-data 
(Husserl 1970a, 1 08). Even so, this passive, anonymous ego remains reflective, engaging 
in an intentional fulfillment of the object, only at a lower level (Bozga 2009, 138-139). 
Heidegger, as we well know, however, thinks little of this privileging of reflective 
intentionality in man's comportment toward the world, arguing that Husserl's theoretical 
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conception of man misses man as Dasein, as a being-in-the-world whose being is 
concealed and revealed through a more basic, dare we say, practical orientation. That 
orientation is care, care as potential self-illumination. The manner in which man is first 
given to himself is not found in the basic structures of theoretical intentionality, in a 
transcendental subjectivity considered apart from every comportment toward the world 
incarnate, but in his always already being involved in the world, alongside other 
historically determined things and taken up into their use according to a practical 
everyday orientation (Heidegger 1996, 195). 
Dasein thus has a pre-ontological sense of its being; a grasp which does not imply 
understanding but a concerned absorption and continuous questioning of its being 
(Heidegger 1996, 183-185). For in Dasein's daily dwelling alongside things and its 
manner of taking them up in view of certain ends, the tissue of affective moods which 
motivate and spur it on attest to its fundamental anxiety for Being, to the fact that its 
Being is not without lack, that, to the contrary, it is thoroughly shot through with lack. 
The lack in Dasein is nothing other than death, specifically its death, against which it 
unfolds as a not-yet, with a field of possibilities (Heidegger 1996, 233-235). As Dasein 
owes itself and its possibilities to itself as a not-yet measured against death, its most 
proper and original possibility is precisely its own impossibility, its finitude and having-
to-die, such that we may say its having-to-be is a having-to-die (Heidegger 1996, 237-
239). 
This being-toward-death which arises from its anxious, first-hand experience of its 
possibilities as residing in its own not-yet being them, in the fact that it is only ever what 
it can in the future be, is therefore properly disclosed through a mode of questioning 
(Heidegger 1996, 231 ). Only in questioning, which already implies uncertainty and 
interpretation, and not in theoretical comprehension, which implies objectivity, 
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possession and completion, can one access this living experience, this historically 
unfolding and incomplete field of possibiliti,es. It is in this questioning, as a natural 
extension of one's Being, that one attains a degree of'mineness', that is to say, a personal 
grasp of one's being-toward-death (Heidegger 1996, 236-239). 
With this ongoing questioning, this questioning that does not call for a final answer, 
but is already itself its own answer, and which thereby provokes only its continuance, or, 
if you like, the deepening of its question, of its questioning, we already sense the opening 
ofHeidegger's hermeneutical approach to phenomenology. If phenomenology is to 
continue in its description of lived experience in its most native and unconditional 
manifestation, then it must acknowledge not only experiences anteriority with respect to 
theoretical reflection, but also that said experience is fundamentally imperfect and 
incomplete. 
Phenomenology is thus an "infinite task" since it stands as "an open process which 
no single vision can conclude" (Paul Ricoeur 1995, 109). As an 'open process', 
interpretation can thus help Dasein avoid "generality in [its] hermeneutical 
understanding" and enable it to better come to bear upon the factual developments that 
inhere in its concrete situation (Heidegger 1999, 14). There is no loss ofrigorhere. To 
the contrary, only through this interpretation and questioning, that is to say, through this 
continual reassessment of its own position and inheritance -- i.e. its own program as 
initiated by Husserl himself-- does one personally affirm rather than dogmatically 
assume the guiding principles and aspirations of phenomenology. We will say more on 
this later. 
For the time being, let us simply note that, for all his advancements upon Husserl, 
Heidegger, with his conception of care and its relation to Being, still operates on a 
reflective level, on one that is not theoretical, to be sure, but rather practical. Inasmuch as 
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care gives onto an active engagement or, if you like, appropriation of one's ownmost 
possibility, it plays a similar methodological role as reflective intentionality in Husserl, 
substituting 'authenticity' for the self-reflexivity of transcendental subjectivity. More 
specifically, though Heidegger puts forward Dasein as a being-in-the-world oriented 
toward the future, toward the end of being, in order to make good on the shortcomings of 
man as subject, as a pre-existing essence that relates to itself in and through all of its 
representations, Dasein's aptitude or distinct relation toward the end, toward the 
possibility of its impossibility, becomes again, whether through an anticipatory 
resoluteness (authenticity) or a flight into things or the crowd (inauthenticity), a relation 
to itself and its unique potentiality-for-being. 
1.2 -A Reduction to Givenness 
Jean-Luc Marion, in agreement with Heidegger concerning Husserl's failure to 
return to the things themselves in their most native and original manifestation, but 
noticing also the former's own shortcomings in this regard, postulates his own reduction 
in view of supporting the principle of all principles. The principle of all principles, 
formulated by Husserl as the crux of phenomenology, reads as follows: 
Every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that 
everything originarily (so to speak, in its 'personal' actuality) offered to us in 
'intuition' is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only 
within the limits in which it is presented there (Husserl 1998, 44). 
As we've seen, phenomenology, in its return to the things themselves, seeks to 
describe the manner in which the phenomenon is given in and of itself. Husserl states: 
"And the task is just this: within the field of pure evidence or self-givenness, to study all 
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forms of givenness and all correlations, and to conduct an elucidatory analysis of them 
all" (Husserl 1990, 10). Phenomenology thus falls to the order of givenness. The 
reduction, in turn, reduces everything, except the given. As Husserl states, the reduction 
excludes "everything that is not evident givenness in its true sense, that is not absolute 
givenness to pure 'seeing"" (Husserl 1990, 7). The reduction, we might say, leads back to 
the given and is itself directed by it. Whenever something can no longer be reduced, as a 
result, it is accepted as given. Husserl states as much when he notes that "above all, it is 
not primarily a matter of establishing as given certain phenomena, but of making visible 
the essence of givenness and the self-constitution of different modes of abjectness" 
(Husserl1990, 51). 
Husserl himself, however, focuses on the phenomenon given as an object to 
intentional consciousness and never establishes a conceptual definition of givenness as 
such. But why, we might ask, particularly in a field whose objectives include a 
bracketing of the natural attitude and its requisite assumptions and dogmatism's, should 
we accept the assumption, fledging of traditional Western thought and its misplaced 
adoration of man as hero of history, that all that is and all that gives itself should be 
bound and gagged under the category of abjectness? Why, this having been said, should 
the phenomenal horizon not open under and as the very givenness that, according to 
Husserl himself, gives appearing to it? In the end, there is absolutely no reason, apart 
from an ungrounded bias, peculiar to Western thought, which heralds man as knower, to 
exclusively consider the phenomenon in terms of abjectness. 
Husserl thus fails to follow through with his essential insight: that, before all else, 
givenness determines and establishes phenomenality (Marion 2002a, 32). It is owing to 
this fact that Marion takes it upon himself to move toward a phenomenology of 
gtvenness. 
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Marion points out that 
a phenomenology of givenness can permit the phenomenon to show itself in itself 
and by itself because it gives itself, but a phenomenality of objectness can only 
constitute the phenomenon on the basis of the ego of a consciousness that intends it 
as its noema. Husserl recoils before his own advance when he restricts givenness to 
one of the lowest levels of its phenomenological possibilities, the object (Marion 
2002a, 32-33). 
Before we venture a direct explication of this phenomenological move toward 
givenness as being onto itself its own horizon, let us first disclose how Heidegger's own 
concentration on Being itself betrays the primacy of givenness. As noted by Husserl, the 
phenomenon gives itself as a being. Givenness, in this sense, governs the beingness of 
beings. Heidegger is adamant, however, that it is none other than the question of Being 
itself that is central to phenomenology. Be that as it may, there is a sense, as Heidegger 
admits, in which being itself hinges on an enigmatic 'it gives' for its being. Being, in its 
phenomenality, is thus brought forward through givenness, through an 'it gives'. Being, 
accomplished in and through a unique mode of manifestation, through an enigmatic, that 
is to say, anonymous, 'it gives', is thereby essentially separate from that which it gives, 
namely beings (Marion 2002a, 34). While it belongs, as an extension, for beings to be, 
Being, as that which both differs and enables beings to be, is not. Being therefore unfolds 
according to the logic of givenness; in short, it belongs to an enigmatic 'it gives', rather 
than a plain 'it is' (Marion 2002a, 35). 
To continue to perform its action as an 'it gives' sheltered in the fact that it is not, it 
therefore falls to Being to remain characterized by a lack of characterization. In other 
words, Being, to stay true to its essence as that which gives, must remain anonymous and 
indeterminate (Marion 2002a, 35). What enables Being to retain its status as an 
anonymous 'it gives' is its mode of appearance, which is that of withdrawal. In brief, 
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being appears in its disappearance, in its withdrawal. Being's activity is here synonymous 
with that of giving, which itself withdraws to give the gift and enable it to appear (Marion 
2002, 35). It is therefore givenness that gives and "uncovers beings in (and without) their 
Being" (Marion 2002a, 36). But, before long, Heidegger labels this 'it' that gives as 
ereignis, as advent, to the extent that this 'it', and the givenness it fosters, is substituted 
altogether for advent. It therefore comes to pass that being, in its givenness, is eclipsed 
by being as advent (Marion 2002a, 37). Although Heidegger thus marks an advancement 
in the description of certain properties specific to givenness, much like Husserl before 
him, he ultimately fails to stand by it. 
1.3- Dominique Janicaud's Critique 
The time is nearly upon us to venture beyond these limited reductions, these 
instances, both that of objectness and beingness, which rise above and cloud that which, 
by virtue of the phenomenological tradition laid out by Husser!, necessarily serves as their 
condition of possibility, namely, givenness itself. To do this, and thus demonstrate how 
givenness may be legitimately laid out on its own terms, we will first tum to Marion's 
analysis of the painting, which, as a common, plainly visible item, demonstrates how all 
phenomena, even those of the garden variety, belong, first and foremost, under the order 
of givenness. 
Before this, however, let us address the objections which have been brought against 
Marion's account of the aforementioned phenomenological reductions. One Dominique 
Janicaud heads-up such a charge, intent as he is to exorcise the theological spirit which, 
so far as he is concerned, has come to bury itself in the phenomenological corpus in view 
of passing itself off as a legitimate philosophical enterprise. 
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Janicaud perceives Husser!, first and foremost, as endeavoring to take up "the 
project of true, universal, and disinterested knowledge, precisely where the sciences lack 
it, at the level of the foundations of knowledge and the principles ofphenomenality" 
(Janicaud 2000, 94). The phenomenologist, as a result, properly concerns himself with "a 
descriptive analytic of the elementary structures of existence" (Janicaud 2000, 35). The 
first offence privy to those of the theological tum, then, consists in the fact that they have 
"nothing to do with the Husserlian enterprise of constitution, which meant -- try as try can 
-- to offer a more fundamental, more true, and more complete knowledge [ connaissance] 
of the different facets of being" (Janicaud 2000, 30). 
Yet, as we've already begun to touch upon in our discussion of Heidegger and his 
move toward a hermeneutical approach to phenomenology, the elementary order of 
experience is refractory to any and all such completion. While Husser! never abandoned 
the reflective stance of his program, he was also not without his doubts concerning its 
limitations: 
it is rationality which, discovering again and again its unsatisfying relativity, is 
driven on its toils, in its will to attain the true and full rationality. But finally it 
discovers that this rationality is an idea residing in the infinite and is de facto 
necessarily on the way (Husser! 1970b, 339). 
The reflective bent of phenomenology, which sets out to describe the basic 
elements of experience, cannot come full circle in this regard since its own activity 
consists in silencing the very stratum of experience from which it is itself derived. In a 
basic sense, such is the nature of all language. Theodor Adorno expresses this in his own 
way when he states that 
every universal principle of a first, even that of facti city in radical empiricism, 
contains abstraction within it. Even empricism could not claim an individual entity 
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here and now, or fact as first, but rather only the principle of the factical in general. 
The first and immediate is always, as a concept, mediated and thus not the first 
(Adorno 1982, 7). 
Returning to Husserl, we may note again that the object given to the intending and 
constituting subject is only ever given partially, never fully, and thus only ever achieves 
unity in its agreement with the mind's nexus of associations, anticipations, and other such 
syntheses (Bozga 2009, 124). In the end, the unity of the "thing-in-itself is presumptive 
and derivative when confronted to the endless adumbrations" (Bozga 2009, 125). Husserl 
can still assert that the object finds a complete givenness in "the pre-phenomenological 
unity of the time-constituting consciousness", in the anonymous ego of which we spoke 
before, and which "forms an all-inclusive unity where different series of primal 
impressions are integrated", however, though it initiates the flow of time, it itself stands 
outside it, independent of it, and thus falls well short of lending itself to any immediate 
description or phenomenological justification (Bozga 2009, 14 7 -148). Indeed, the 
insistence upon a perfectly neutral and reflective ego dwelling wholly outside temporality 
seems little more than a theoretical bias on Husserl's part. 
The ultimate basis for unity in Husserl's scheme of object-constitution goes without 
much in the way of support, and, correspondingly, the ideal of complete and objective 
description in phenomenology rests on less than stable grounds, to say the least. Instead, 
if phenomenology is to remain without presumption and bias, then it must come to terms 
with its non-adequation with experience, with the subject as something other than a 
disinterested spectator, and, in an attentive and, yes, rigorous reconsideration of the basic 
structures oflife, seek to draw out the implications of an experience whose modes of 
givenness exceed the subjects centrifugal intentionality and its desire for the enclosure 
and safety of complete constitution. 
Moving more specifically to Marion, J anicaud's central qualm so far as his 
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phenomenology of givenness is concerned has to do with his resignation of the bracketing 
of the natural attitude (i.e. the reduction). Integral to Marion's phenomenology, as we 
will in good time see, is his conception of a pure form of the call and of givenness as 
saturated phenomenon. As for the former, Janicaud deems it "a rather dry mystical night" 
(Janicaud 2000, 63). As he continues, "the superabundance of grace has been put through 
the Heideggerian ringer. But the qualifying terms, in any case, are neither human nor 
finite: pure, absolute, unconditioned-- such is the call" (Janicaud 2000, 63). The end 
result, so far as Janicaud is concerned, is that "the only tie that binds" the pure form of 
the call "to whatever kind of experience is religious" (Janicaud 2000, 63). 
A strange criticism, this is, insofar as Marion, in insisting upon the pure, 
anonymous call, rather than a particular version established by this or that authority, 
religious or otherwise, approaches the call on a conceptual level, as a possibility, and not 
as an actuality, which would necessarily find itself inscribed in a particular tradition and 
thus feed a biased viewpoint. As Marion suggests, the "voice that reveals reveals 
precisely because it remains voiceless, more exactly nameless, but in the Name. The 
Name gives itself only in saying itself without any name, therefore in all" (Marion 2002a, 
297). The call here unfolds according to the logic of the gift: to give the gift, the giver 
cannot announce or even know itself as giver, insofar as this identity would obfuscate the 
call in the pointed calling for recognition and reciprocity. Similarly, the call, in order to 
be given as such, must not call with a known or otherwise determinate voice, but in an 
anonymity whose 'voice' only sounds after it is heard in a recipient who steps forward and 
responds. This anonymity is therefore not synonymous with a mysterious "unknown" or 
hidden God-head, but with the essence of the call as such. The lover's call will serve as 
an example: an individual, a lover, if you like, goes out into the world and, quite 
unbeknownst to herself, extends a call readily available to all; to most it comes to 
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nothing; some glimpse it quickly and move on quicker still, while others fail to so much 
as notice it. But "let one of the listeners take upon himself the call of this face (if their 
gazes truly cross), and 'it was like an epiphany' --the responsal will confer its unique 
name (possibly its surname) on the call because the gifted will have let himselfbe entirely 
governed by what he will receive" (Marion 2002a, 298-299). Such plain situations, in 
which the pure call resounds outside identity and presence, widespread as they are, attest 
to the fact that this structure does not lead back to a theology, but instead issues from an 
attempt to draw out the necessary consequences of taking seriously the role originarily 
promised to givenness by phenomenology. Far from contravening the epoche, Marion's 
pure form of the call supports and reinforces it, revealing a sustained interest on his part 
to work within the leading principles ofHusserlian phenomenology. 
It is altogether wrong-headed, in this light, for Janicaud to claim that Marion, 
instead of respecting phenomenology as "a space of possible truths", unduly privileges a 
particular (religious) tradition, his own (Janicaud 2000, 94-95). Janicaud, in keeping with 
phenomenology, contends that it needs continue in tending to "the open field ... of the 
entire human experience" (Janicaud 2000, 94-95). But this is precisely what Marion 
fights for with his phenomenological work. In constructing a third reduction, and even 
his conception of a pure form of the call, Marion seeks to go beyond the unnecessarily 
limited horizons of abjectness and beingness so as to be open to givenness in all its forms, 
sans restrictions, limitations and so on. It is precisely on account of this reduction that 
phenomenality is freed from the requirement of a ground, and that intuition is no longer 
constrained to a relation of adequation with respect to the intentionality of the subject. In 
suspending these theoretical prejudices, phenomenology may open itself to a mode of 
givenness that consists in a manifestation that frustrates the centrifugal intentionality of 
the subject but that does not fail to achieve phenomenality for all that. In short, owing to 
11 
this third reduction to givenness, phenomenology may finally assess an experience 
undeniably held by many: that of being called to attention, indeed being called to oneself, 
not in and through an enclosed and private I, but in a 'me' that is open and moves forever 
outward into the phenomenon come from elsewhere. 
When Janicaud comes to Marion's concept of the saturated phenomenon, he rebukes 
it for an unwarranted privileging of infinity and for propagating an inverse intentionality 
that does violence to the traditional conception of the subject. In addressing this 
criticism, we must first take note that it stands as an instance, and by no means the only 
one, wherein Janicaud shows himself to be selectively blind in his grasp of the history of 
phenomenology. Inverse intentionality is not the fledgling of the theological tum but in 
fact has its origin in the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, a staunch atheist. With his analysis of 
the Look in Being and Nothingness, Sartre demonstrated how it is in being seen, and not 
only in seeing, that one comes to an awareness of oneself as a being-for-others, that is to 
say, as not only a subject but also an object in a world organized around the aims of 
others (Sartre 1992, 387-390). It is, as an extension, in becoming aware of how one 
stands in the eyes of others that one comes to wait for oneself in the future, as with others, 
with certain expectations. 
Finally, so far as this matter of inverse intentionality is concerned, we need also 
note that it does not violate the subject as much as Janicaud might like to suppose. In 
hastily equating inverse intentionality with a nullification of the subject, Janicaud's 
conservatism comes to the fore. By privileging the unpredictable, counter-intentional 
call, Marion does not annul the role of the subject but only alters its manner of activity. 
The self still serves as the center of phenomenality, as that to which all phenomena must 
come and burst upon in order to achieve their own apparition. Now, however, since the 
initiative which marks the onset of this process issues from the phenomena itself, the self 
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receives both itself and the phenomena by exposing itself and responding to its call. We 
need not even say that this act of reception rules out constitution altogether. For the 
reception favored by Marion is not wholly passive, at least not in the traditional sense. 
Reception still implies a measure of constitution on the part of the recipient. In receiving, 
the self constitutes and lends a measure of determinacy to an otherwise less than 
determinate occurrence, but not in the sense of exhausting or possessing as product, but in 
allowing to come to form something of what was already given. Both activity and 
passivity are implied in what we will call this more primordial form of passivity. 
That this reconfiguration of the self is explored on a phenomenological basis should 
come as no cause for alarm: if, as we've said, phenomenology is to remain rigorous and 
not lapse into dogmatism, prejudices and the like, then it must also be attentive to its own 
past, to its own letter; first, in order to see whether this past isn't itself without its 
theoretical prejudices, and second, to see that they aren't taken up in a dogmatic fashion. 
To be faithful to a tradition, in this sense, as Derrida points out, is to remain, at least in 
part, decidedly unfaithful to it (Derrida 2004, 160). It is perhaps no mistake that, from its 
very beginning, and not simply with today's theological tum, thinkers in the 
phenomenological tradition, from Sartre to Merleau-Ponty, while abiding by certain 
principles fundamental to phenomenology, each assessed, critiqued, and ultimately went 
their own way with Husserl's corpus, itself wrangled with problems, doubts, and 
indecision's. Phenomenology, as "a space of possible truths", and with its corresponding 
need to remain methodically multifaceted and open to these experiences undergone by 
many, if not all, can therefore have little to do with Janicaud's predilection for a skeletal 
Husser! who never existed in the first place, and whose specter is simply conjured up to 
disguise the unfounded fears of a frightened conservatism (J anicaud 2000, 94-95). 
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Chapter 2- The Painting as l'lsiole Par Excellence: 
2.1- The Non-Ontic Coming Forward ofthe Painting 
To enable a complete return to the things themselves, Marion, instead of springing 
ahead of the phenomenon into the arms of his own subjective specifications, endeavors to 
follow alongside it, allowing its apparition to come forward and accomplish its own 
appearance as givenness. In turning our attention to the painting, as one of the most 
plainly visible phenomena, as we will do now, we will, in showing how givenness 
rationally articulates its rise to its own apparition, by extension demonstrate how all 
lesser, that is to say, ordinary, phenomena can similarly be said to fall under the guidance 
of givenness. On the one hand, the painting stands as a basic object, caught in an 
objective presence, subject to the viewer's touch. On the other, and in quite another way, 
the paintings persistence in presence, its status as an object, falls well short of accounting 
for its visibility or even its effect upon the viewer. Were a painting's visibility engulfed 
in its subsistence, in its being-there, in its being what it is, for that matter, such that, as its 
audience, we might arrive truly at it, then a single viewing would, for all intents and 
purposes, satisfy us (Marion 2002a, 41 ). And yet, as experience shows, nothing of the 
sort obtains. One is urged to return to the painting time and again, precisely because it is 
not in seeing it as an object that one truly sees it (Marion 2002a, 41-42). 
Already in the activity that goes into the painting's preparation, by "moving it so it 
can be visible, by situating it at the right distance, keeping it under the gaze, by exposing 
it carefully to the emotions", it is implicitly acknowledged that "in this or that subsistence 
already visible of itself (canvas, backing, materials, etc), there is also something else to 
see besides the subsistent" (Marion 2002a, 42). What remains unaccounted for in the 
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subsistence of the painting is therefore the painting itself, the painting not as an object but 
as an act, as a non-ontic coming forward, whose invisible gesture, whose raw upsurge, 
opens up visibility. The painting's appearing, the advance of its givenness, in this sense, 
appears quite apart from, and indeed in inverse proportion to, what supports it (i.e. the 
canvas, backing- in short, all that makes up its objective subsistence) (Marion 2002a, 39-
41). In order to see the painting, and not simply its supporting materials, in tum, the 
viewer needs not simply notice it, letting his gaze slide along its lines and forms, but must 
allow himself to undergo it, to feel its upsurge, to give it his gaze, his attention, and, in so 
doing, see himself arise from what he receives (Marion 2002b, 111 ). 
Michel Henry, in taking up Wassily Kandinsky's copious essays on the matter, 
similarly notes that art, as an exteriority, is a modality of the radical interiority of life, of 
life as a self-givenness, as an immediate and non-objectifiable pathos and passion (Henry 
2009, 122). It is only for fear of this pathos that one prefers to keep it at bay, to hang it 
on that unfortunate Greek telos, representation, and only paint our individual 
specifications, the contents our own garden, everyday bric-a-brac, rather than life itself, 
which "we experience ... within ourselves as something we have neither posited nor willed, 
as something that passes through us without ourselves as its cause" (Henry 2009, 127). In 
its essence, therefore, the painting comes forward as an immediate and invisible pathos, 
experienced through the invisible dimension of the visible colors and forms, through the 
dynamic and affective qualities intrinsic to them and their specific arrangement in the 
work in question. 
There is no question, then, of acceding to the painting by external reality, whose 
token it would be, or the stirrings of history, whose inception, truth, and remnant it might 
have been, or even the penchants and plagues of the artist, whose regality it supposedly 
rediscovers. "The theme is its real, invisible content, its abstract content", which perfectly 
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coincides with its upsurge (Henry 2009, 121). This is not to say that the artwork is 
"absorbed into form", only that "form is absorbed into life. This is because no sensation 
of form or colour is possible without an auto-affect or auto-impression -- without life" 
(Henry 2009, 121). Inasmuch as the self receives itself from this self-givenness, from this 
affectation that 'takes' it, its exposure and subjection to its inexhaustible excess means 
growth not diminishment, the growth of an egoism that furthers the pathos and passion of 
life, rather than turning it into mere narcissism and solipsism (Descartes). The life of the 
self is this growth, this unpredictable stirring, which comes to us in art: 
[As we] watch forces that slumbered within us, waiting stubbornly and patiently 
for millennia, even from the beginning of time. These forces explode into the 
violence and gleam of colours; they open spaces and engender the forms of worlds. 
The forces of the cosmos are awakened within us. They lead us outside of time to 
join in their celebration dance and they do not let go of us (Henry 2009, 142). 
Indeed, this position is not without historical antecedent. Kant himself, in 
construing the beautiful as "the form of the finality of an object, insofar as it is perceived 
in it without representation of an end", emphasizes that, in matters of taste, the fmality 
applicable to this domain stands quite apart from an "objective finality, i.e., the relation of 
the object to a determinate end" (Kant 1978, 120). The finality ofthe work of art is 
therefore not found, by way of a concept, term, object, or end outside itself. Bearing this 
in mind, Kant defines subjective finality, in contradistinction, as that which goes "without 
any material and concept of that with which it is to agree" (Kant 1978, 112). Continuing 
in this vein, then, Marion may rightfully insist that the painting, anterior and refractory to 
any concept which might accomplish its objective representation, far from ending in an 
object other than itself, remains and accomplishes its finality in and by itself. 
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2.2- The {!uesrion o/ Aeau(J! 
The finality of beauty, of the work of art, resting in itself, as we've seen, is adverse 
to the horizon of the object, but equally so to that of being. Heidegger states that "beauty 
is a mode according to which the truth deploys itself as unconcealedness", where the 
unconcealedness is that of Being accomplished through particular beings situated in a 
particular time and place in the world (Heidegger 2001, 43). Hence the finitude of Being, 
and the artwork, caught in its thrall, as a channel through which the history of a particular 
people is constituted and brought to the fore. In so construing beauty, however, 
Heidegger denies that it might be given on its own, and allows it to function only in the 
name of something other than itself, such that its self is a not-self, its realization a 
negation, its accomplishment a defeat, in proportion to which the embers of being are 
illuminated all the more. 
Yet this conception of the artwork begins to crumble upon due consideration of the 
fact that, more often than not, the 'truth' of a painting, its being what it is, namely the 
disclosure of a particular historical people, whose proper contemplation, at least by those 
circumscribed in that very spatial-temporal position, spurs on a state of authenticity, has 
little, if any, bearing on the painting's beauty. This is what Husserl himself noticed when 
considering the book as a "phenomena invested with spirit" (Husserl 1989, 248). When 
viewing the book in itself, that is, as a book, as something to be read, its thing-like status, 
which cannot be denied, cannot itself lead one to this impression. And this, if for no other 
reason, precisely because beauty does not reside in showing something in the world, but 
in a non-ontic flaring up which makes an addition to phenomenality and, in so doing, 
beckons the previously inattentive gaze forward. 
As Husserl continues "I see what is thingly about [the book] insofar as it appears to 
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me, but 'I live in the sense comprehending it'. And while I do so the spiritual unity of the 
sentence" is maintained (Husserl 1989, 248). In the case of the painting, then, Marion 
remains consistent with Husser! in asserting that, though he 
must of course apprehend it as a thing .. .it is precisely not this that opens it to me as 
beautiful; it is that I 'live' its meaning, namely its beautiful appearing, which has 
nothing thinglike to it, since it cannot be described as the property of a thing, 
demonstrated by reasons, or hardly even be said. What is essential - the beautiful 
appearing- remains unreal, an 'I know not what', that I must seek, await, touch, but 
which is not comprehensible (Marion 2002a, 46). 
Outside the purview of being, indeed, running retrograde to its 
concealed/unconcealed bi-polarity, the artwork does not properly serve as an answer to its 
question(ing), but reveals a more fundamental question behind it, that of the upsurge, 
sufficient onto itself, which wrangles unexpected surprise -- admiration, if you like --
from the individual before whom it has been strategically placed (Marion 2002a, 47). 
Indeed, we might add, as final testament to the painting's providence, its life, if you 
will, which exists quite apart from its being, the simple fact that, Heidegger's 
protestations notwithstanding, examples abound of artworks whose appeal has little, if 
anything, to do with their historical ties. Works of an exceptional sort, though 
undoubtedly revealing different layers depending on the paradigms of the generation 
within which it is received, harbor, as experience will attest, a more primordial 
dimension, one specific to itself, which thereby cuts across spatial, temporal, and cultural 
demarcations, inciting intrigue, wonder, and contemplation through nothing other than its 
own self-sufficient upsurge. 
To see the painting in itself as it gives itself from itself, then, one must, if there is to 
be any question of phenomenological rigor, not rest content, as easy as it would be, with 
the painting as mere object or being, but with what Henry refers to as its pure impression 
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or effect (Henry 2009, 72). The effect which we here mean to touch upon, the one which 
concerns artists so, whose first rustling's we've already divulged, is that which, far from 
"affecting the mind by means of physical causes (though it does that also)", is an 
elementary one wherein the soul vibrates with the pathos of the paintings continual 
coming, its emergence into visibility (Marion 2002a, 51). Henry observes this effect 
unfolding, not in the visible aspect of colors, but in and through their invisible aspect, 
through the dynamic power that ensnares the viewer's attention and renders it visible 
(Henry 2009, 72). As Marion notes, in reference to a painting bathed in blushing light: 
[That] this luminosity itself does not strike me as a fact of color; rather, this fact of 
color strikes me only in that it makes me undergo a passion: that, in Kandinsky's 
terms, of ochre tinged with gold - the passion undergone by the soul affected by the 
profound serenity of the world saved and protected by the last blood of the setting 
sun (Marion 2002a, 51). 
To the see the painting, accordingly, is to see it where it can't be seen; to see in the 
sense of open and exposed feeling, an undergoing of its uprising in the stirred passion and 
enriched sense oflife that ensues. Such is the painting's effect, its very self, which, 
entrusted to itself, gives itself from itself, in its most primal phenomenality, as a pure 
givenness. In bracketing all that is not pure phenomenality- objectness and beingness-
Marion's third reduction thus accomplishes the taking out of play of bracketing (i.e. of the 
reduction) as laid out by Husser!, enabling the painting to appear in proportion to the 
extent that it is considered apart from every supposition or sentiment of the world 
(Marion 2002a, 52). 
We have thus established, in the case of the painting as a visible par excellence, and 
by extension phenomena of a more ordinary sort, that appearance fully comes forward 
through this reduction to the pure given. A givenness that gives itself implies, however, 
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as a giving, a recipient, a givee. With this in mind, we find ourselves amongst a series of 
questions whose proper assessment will further our explication of givenness and its 
central role in the appearing of phenomena. More specifically, if'giving itself implies a 
givee, then, as Janicaud has asked, might we not say that the gift, far from being donated 
through givenness itself, is in fact the effect of an efficient cause? And, furthermore, even 
were this not to be the case, and the gift given were permitted to stand outside a priori 
conditions of knowledge, as well as causal and economic orders, would it not, as Jacques 
Derrida has argued, disappear at once? (Derrida 1992, 35) To tend to these questions, let 
us begin our exploration of Marion's conception of the gift as a model of givenness. 
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Chapter ..l- That Model o/ Civennes~ the Cfft: 
3.1 -Suspending the Givee and the Giver 
It is first noted that givenness, as a concept, organizes "its act (to give), as well as 
what is at stake (gift), indeed the actor (giver) and the mode of the accomplished given 
(given as characteristic)" (Marion 2002a, 61-62). The given is thus at once the event and 
the mode of access to it. The given, in tum, cannot be divorced from givenness. Indeed, it 
is identical with it, shot through with its trace, such that we may say that the given 
manifests and "bears the fold of givenness" (Marion 2002a, 65). It is this formulation, 
particularly when seen against the backdrop of Marcel Mauss' work on the role of the gift 
in potlatch ceremonies, wherein reciprocity is the lubricant and the attainment of identity 
the aim of all gifts exchanged, that serves as temptation to fall back on such a tradition 
when approaching Marion's conception of givenness (Marcel Mauss 1990, 33). 
According to this tradition, "the giver gives the gift in the role of efficient cause, 
mobilizing a formal and material cause (in order to define, reify the gift), and pursuing a 
final cause (the good of the givee and/or the glory of the giver)" (Marion 2002a, 75). 
Givenness, employing these four causes, holds to the principle of sufficient reason, which 
stipulates "that nothing happens without its being possible for one who has enough 
knowledge of things to give a reason sufficient to determine why it is thus and not 
otherwise" (Leibniz 1973, 199). Givenness, then, far from undoing man's power of 
knowledge, itself attests to it as its condition of possibility. Once again, as a result, 
givenness is rendered secondary and subordinate to something else -- the power of 
knowledge-- more significant to it than it itself. In necessitating the response of the 
other, who, under the law of reciprocity, is obliged to return the gift, lest he be lost to 
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himself, deemed less than equal to the challenge proffered by the other, and, in so doing, 
re-establishes harmony, equality, and identity. Inasmuch as this remains the case, 
givenness can indeed be seen as conforming to the order of exchange, marked by 
causality and the law of identity. 
But, as outlined by Marion, givenness, as a final rather than first principle, which 
withdraws so that the given might come forward on its own, to remain consistent with 
itself, requires a loss of oneself, a renunciation of equality with oneself, and thus a law of 
non-return. Givenness, in contrast to mere exchange, can therefore have nothing to do 
with presence (as subsistence), possession, knowledge, utility, or identity. 
With this Derrida concurs (Derrida 1992, 35). Indeed, he goes further still and 
asserts that the gift's aforementioned conditions of possibility are simultaneously the 
marks of its impossibility. Derrida insists that the gift exists as such on 
the condition of not being or appearing to be the gift of anything, of anything that is 
or that is present, come from someone and given to someone? On the condition of 
'being' a gift without given and without giving, without presentable thing and act? A 
gift that would neither give itself, nor give itself as such, and that could not take 
place except on the condition of not taking place -- and of remaining impossible, 
without dialectical sublation of the contradiction? (Derrida 1992, 35). 
Marion and Derrida thus agree that the gift must take place outside of all commerce 
and exchange, indeed, outside of presence, self-reflexivity and identity. Their principle 
disagreement lies in their respective interpretations of these circumstances: for Derrida, 
the gift, as refractory to presence and identification, means that it can never truly appear 
and achieve phenomenality: it remains always a yet-to-be-given, an im-possibility, like 
forgiveness, which is not an end but a beginning, indeed an opening, open insofar as 
closed, as a tantalizing (im)possibility which holds us rapt with attention and urges us to 
hope, prepare, and await. The gift, as im-possible, opens hope, leaves us waiting, and 
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thus leads to "the animation of a neutral and homogeneous time by the desire of the gift 
and the restitution" (Derrida 1992, 40). The im-possibility of the gift thus gives time 
(Derrida 1992, 41 ). Marion on the other hand, upholds that the gift, though impossible in 
the sense of exceeding the mind's power of knowledge and of thus contravening the 
principle of sufficient reason, can and does achieve phenomenality through its own 
givenness, outside the horizon of objectness and beingness. 
Let us first note, though, that Derrida's hesitancy about assigning the gift any 
manner of phenomenality issues from the following insight: "How does one desire 
forgetting or the non-keeping of the gift if, implicitly, the gift is evaluated as good, indeed 
as the origin of what is good, of the good, and of value?" (Derrida 1992, 36) As Derrida 
himself acknowledges that gifts are "decisive and ... therefore tear the fabric, interrupt the 
continuum of a narrative that nevertheless they call for", it is curious to see him so 
quickly align the gift with value and the good (Derrida 1992, 123). Traditionally, in the 
case of gifts from on high, from the Gods, even when they are made most plain 
beforehand, we can but interpret their intimations according to our own capacities and 
thus their actual donation invariably contradicts our foreknowledge and strikes with 
surprise. Hence the expression, "be careful what you wish for" -- getting one wants or 
expects is at least as troubling as not getting it. The gift is thus not only decisive but, as a 
matter of principle, comes from an elsewhere so far removed that its use is, more often 
than not, altogether non-existent. 
In fact, given that one cannot accurately anticipate the nature of the gift, even when 
there is some fore-taste or parting of the sky, it is something of a question as to whether 
the givee will ever be able to recognize and thus call to mind the specific nature of the 
gift. The forgetting of the gift, as a result, does not have to be done, willed, desired, 
because it is always already done. The forgetting of the gift, at least at first, is not a 
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choice. But this does not stop the gift from being received, nor does it stand as evidence 
to the impossibility of its being given. There are no small number of gifts which are 
received without the recipient having the slightest inkling for their having been given. A 
man does not grasp or understand the love others feel for him, which they give him 
continually, much as he doesn't grasp or remember his birth. And yet both of these gifts 
continue to influence, guide, and affect him throughout his life. We venture these 
statements as a sketch, as something of an aside. A proper discussion will follow shortly. 
The central issue is simply this: as proper as Derrida's concerns surrounding the gift 
are, in supporting Marion's position, it falls to us to show that, although refractory to the 
domain of presence, and the knowledge and identity that dwell therein, the gift is not 
condemned to a renunciation of phenomenality. There is a loss of phenomenality, of the 
phenomenality of the gift, only in presence, in knowledge, identity, utility. The problem, 
therefore, is not in their loss, but in the presumption that they (presence, knowledge, 
identity) hold a monopoly on manifestation and phenomenality, when in fact they 
represent but a modality of it, and not even the most important or primordial one. To 
remedy this, we need show how the gift might accomplish its own phenomenality outside 
that of being, marked as it is by subsistence (presence), exchange, and identity (Marion 
2002a, 79). Put differently, we need show how the gift can acknowledge that it is not, 
that it does not appear in presence, but that this does not mean that it does not appear, that 
it does not give itself from itself. 
The gift, as an exception to being, can maintain its phenomenality insofar as it, and 
its act (to give), stakes (gift), and actor (given), can be given as bracketed, suspended 
from their transcendencies (exchange, objectness, beingness), in a word, absent. This will 
require a triple epoche (that of the givee, the giver, and, finally, the gift itself). 
We begin with the givee. Were the givee to stand as anterior to the gift, already 
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present, anticipating the latter's arrival, then, far from easing the gift along to its 
completion, it would hinder it, indeed annul it, by assuming the role of "efficient cause, 
by possibly having prompted it through supplication; and as the "final cause, too, by 
having justly deserved it through its misery or its deeds" (Marion 2002a, 86). Indeed, the 
smallest trace of the givee's presence would all but necessitate some manner of 
repayment, of reciprocity, which, soon enough, would nurse one back into the calm, 
comfortable circuit of calculation, commerce and its exchange of stable unities. To avoid 
this, the gift must be divested of a specific givee. Giving must take place in its absentia, 
in a "giving with abandon", without any discernible token or trace of the act remaining 
afterwards (Marion 2002a, 86). The gift needs be lost, as Marion notes, "for me, but not 
for everyone. It's necessary that an Other receive it and definitively deprive me of it. It's 
also necessary that this other not pay me back, not only that he not want to 
(psychologically) but that he cannot (on principle) thus reinscribe the gift, me, and 
himself in economic exchange" (Marion 2002a, 86-87). 
In this case, so long as the economy of exchange stands as that which is to be 
avoided for the sake of the gift, ingratitude pays a certain gratitude to the givenness of the 
gift, helping to ensure that it is not recognized or received as such and thus incorporated 
into such a system (Marion 2002a, 88-89). More importantly, though, the bracketing of 
the givee, which takes place in lieu of a known givee, whose presence would condition 
the gift and annul it as such, only lends further support to the givee by universalizing him 
(Marion 2002a, 92). The gift can only be given when it is given to anyone, irrespective of 
their character, moral or otherwise. In brief, the gift is given "in complete indifference to 
the worthiness or unworthiness of the givee" (Marion 2002a, 94). A particularly 
Husserlian point, this is, inasmuch as it treats the givee in its essence, in its manner of 
givenness, rather than this or that particular formulation derived from experience on the 
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sublunary plane. 
This formulation also sheds light on the nature of the gift itself: there is only a 
question of the gift, as that which stands outside all economy and causality, as a giving in 
abandon, when the givee is unknown, distant, far off in the future (Marion 2002a, 93). In 
keeping with this, it is important to note that, though the ingratitude of the givee does the 
gift a certain favor, it is not the only proper response to the gift. The gift can also be 
accepted. But acceptance here does not assume the form of repayment, of returning the 
gift to the giver, but in "sending it downstream (toward a givee yet to come)" (Marion 
2002a, 93). Ifthere is a question of the gift, then it is a giving that gives nothing more 
nor less than one's very self, for which there is no equivalent, and thus, from the start, no 
question of return. Parenting, teaching, love, and life serve as fitting examples. If one 
admires a teacher, or loves a parent, one does not accept and embrace that admiration or 
love by returning it to the giver, as though one were "participating in a contract" (Marion 
2002a, 93). 
No, rather than erecting monuments of the father, or returning the teacher's 
knowledge to him, telling him what one expects he will want to hear, what will flatter him 
so, one acknowledges and honors the unrepayable gift by continuing the tradition in one's 
own way, "by [oneself] becoming the giver of a new knowledge" (Marion 2002a, 93 ). 
The gift thus comes to settle upon the unknown (i.e. not present) givee after a certain 
period of time has elapsed. In and through this double lack - in the form of 
unforeseeability and delay - the impossibility of givee as origin and condition of the gift 
finds a final attestation (Marion 2002a, 93-94). It is only here, with the suspension of the 
givee, that we find the gift truly given. 
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.J.2- .Presen/ in Absence.· The Gf/l and irs Consequences 
The giver's bracketing is equally essential to the proper operation of the gift. Were 
the giver aware of himself as giver, his very self-consciousness of himself would produce 
a sense of self-contentment, of status, identity, necessitating due recognition and return 
from others, thus returning one to the realm of exchange. The gift, to the contrary, is 
given only when the giver disappears as such. Besides, as Marion notes, when one gives 
in the truest sense, when one "gives without reserve, or 'gives it [one's] all"', one is 
"ignorant of the effect that [one] produces on a possible givee" (Marion 2002a, 97). 
Insofar as this holds, that is, insofar as "the effect remains inaccessible to its giver, it must 
be inferred that the latter does not know the effect, therefore that the effect has no need of 
the giver in order to be given" (Marion 2002a, 97). 
In the case of lovers, for example - though we might also refer to friends, artists, 
craftsmen - the lover, upon giving, though even afterwards, never truly knows the nature, 
effect, significance, or depth of the gift imparted on the givee (Marion 2002a, 97-98). In 
the giver's distance from and ignorance of his own gift, he testifies to the fact that the 
latter can, indeed must, be accomplished in his absence, and thus only from its own 
givenness. A gift is given in view of neither knowledge (of oneself as giver), recognition 
(paid out in reciprocity on the part of the givee), nor retribution (Marion 2002a, 98). The 
gift is given for its own sake, and for nothing else besides. 
Though there will be more to say about this later, let us note here that this 
suspension of the giver, of his own non-knowledge of himself as giver, his self-forgetting, 
whose fruit is a giving in abandon, entails a moving outside identity, a renunciation of 
one'sability (and, by extension, one's authenticity) to forge a response that corresponds 
and is adequate to the call of the original impression and thus of gathering oneself into an 
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equality, an identity, where there is a sense, indeed a security, of self-consciousness, of 
'being oneself'. The giver, in giving, breaks with identity, pushing beyond its self-
consciousness by losing himself in the process of giving, in being caught up in the 
activity, a higher one, to be sure, of giving himself rather than being himself The giver, 
in other words, gives himself in further exposing himself to the unmasterable excess of 
the phenomenon and acknowledging that there is ultimately no correspondence and 
adequation between call and response: the gifted subject is always already caught up and 
behind the call which births and bears him forward; it is this delay, this inappropriateness, 
this inauthenticity, that is appropriate to the structure of temporal givenness. 
With the bracketing of the givee and the giver, there remains but the gift itself. For 
the gift not to see itself inscribed in the order of exchange, by being reduced to a mere 
object or being, it too must be bracketed. Besides, are these conceptions of the gift not 
simply the products of the natural attitude? Considered under a proper reduction, the gift 
is not tantamount to a solidified point that is transferred from one party to another 
(Marion 2002a, 103). When dealing strictly with matters of the gift, as under friendship 
or love, the gift is not synonymous with an object and its exchange. In these cases, the 
"object either disappears from the game or is reduced to merely an extra, interchangeable, 
and optional support (souvenir, keepsake, or wage, etc.), in short, to a mere index of 
what's really at stake in the gift, much more precious and serious than the object that 
conventionally represents it" (Marion 2002a, 103-1 04). 
The giving of oneself to the beloved, and more specifically, of one's body in the 
sexual encounter, "is annulled as a gift of self as soon as this transfer becomes either an 
appropriation by the Other or the price for exchange" (Marion 2002a, 104). To be 
regarded as gift, in other words, one's body cannot be conceived simply as an object 
whose action provokes a mutual and competing reaction, in short, an exchange between 
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equals, thereby affirming each other's identities. The body as object is here sheltered as 
object exchanged, rather than exposed as giving itself. What is given in this giving of 
oneself to the beloved, is his non-objectifiable life, his abandon. Since one's abandon is 
here indeed non-objectifiable, a wedding band or some other such object serves merely as 
support, offering a "symbolic index of this gift, without common measure with what is 
nevertheless shown in it" (Marion 2002a, 105). 
Finally, let us consider the gift through a giving of one's word. In order to give our 
word, "we do not give an object; we do not even promise a being." (Marion 2002a, 1 05). 
What is given, for all that, is something that has undeniably real effects: a slaking of 
doubts, a giving of assurance (Marion 2002a, 1 05). Marion continues: 
[T]he gift of the word, precisely because it does not coincide with any particular 
object, succeeds in radically modifying the status of each of the objects I deal with-
- things ... will be set forth in conformity with my word. To give my word does not 
amount to making my statements adequate to the things (theoretical truth), but 
rather the things adequate to what I promise to a certain Other (Marion 2002a, 1 05). 
The word, outside the order of objects, in a state of unreality, in and of itself, as a 
giving of itself, achieves a very real appearance, which rouses and resonates with those 
individuals and things around it. Indeed, the manner of temporality within which a giving 
of one's word arises, the fact that it always involves the future, a keeping of one's word 
over the stated period of time - which may be a life-time, as in the case oflove - itself 
illustrates that "not one of its accidental objects at any moment coincides with its 
objective -- to remain faithful to what was said" (Marion 2002a, 1 05). One's word is thus 
kept, its effects effectively given, not by crystallizing in the present, but in enduring 
outside it, beyond it. A giving of one's word therefore exemplifies the gift as that which 
is accomplished outside all objectness and beingness. And so with this, it comes fully 
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into view that givenness not only abides but requires, for the accomplishment of its 
appearance, the bracketing of the givee, the giver, and the gift. It is this model of the gift 
that provides us with a greater determination of givenness and how it successfully gives 
itself from itself. 
The gift, as the model of givenness, pictured here, after the reduction, through 
everyday human relationships -- friendship, parenting, love, etc -- demonstrates how this 
givenness needn't be regarded as principally issuing from theology. As near and dear as 
givenness would thus far seem to be to the dictates of phenomenology and everyday 
experience, those cries which seek to huddle it all too quickly under theology, frequent 
and vivid as they are, themselves begin to seem less concerned with phenomenology 
proper as with the survival of one of its types, of its narrowly prescribed tradition rather 
than its life, which has rested in it always, and which may yet come forward, in ever-new, 
unpredictable, and perhaps even upsetting forms. With the next chapter we will pursue 
this further, beginning with a discussion of the phenomenon in its unpredictable landing 
and the anamorphosis compelled on the part of the subject as gifted rather than giver. 
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Chapter 4- Civenness and its LJeterminations 
4.1- Contingent Phenomena 
We have endeavored to show how Marion's third reduction alone enables the gift to 
withdraw from the natural attitude, where it is hidden under the transcendent guises of 
abjectness or beingness, and is ordered by exchange, calculation, and the self-reflexivity 
of identity, toward a properly phenomenological attitude, where its essence as givenness 
allows it to come forward from itself and achieve its own appearance. Givenness, quite 
apart from being a petty predilection or doctrinal bias, is thus betrayed as what is most 
basic and essential to phenomena achieving their own appearance, to the extent that no 
phenomena can appear without first giving itself. We will now move to explicate how 
this logic thereby needs find itself redoubled in phenomena broadly construed. 
If a given is to be shot through with givenness through in through, such that it not 
only enters under its rule but is characterized by it in its entire mode of phenomenality, 
then we need once again bracket the givee, that is, the I as constitutor. Were the I 
admitted as constituting agent, as always already accomplished, in advance of the 
phenomenon's arrival, then the latter would never in fact arrive as such, but only ever as 
the effect of the former as efficient cause. The phenomenon, rather than having its own 
autonomy, its own status and legitimacy, would therefore only ever appear conditionally, 
that is to say, partially, to the extent to which it agrees with and falls under its exterior 
condition( s ). We thus contravene the principle of all principles, which, as we've seen, 
states that "every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition" 
(Husser11998, 44). A phenomenon must instead come from elsewhere, outside such 
horizons and conditions. 
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On the one hand, this elsewhere determines the phenomenon as issuing from 
outside the circuit of commerce and calculation, indeed from outside the consent and 
foresight of the constituting I (Marion 2002a, 122). On the other hand, lest this elsewhere 
itself come to serve as cause and condition, as a limit on phenomena, we need note that 
by right it is not exterior but immediate to phenomena (Marion 2002a, 123). The 
phenomenon coincides with this elsewhere, this elsewhere that opens up a spacing within 
it, that forges a distance internal to it, whose traversal subsequently characterizes its 
manner of appearing: the phenomenon appears from an elsewhere that is internal to it, 
that is to say, from within its innermost depths. From this depth, or, if you like, from this 
first-order form, amorphous and indistinct, the phenomenon thus rises to its second-order 
form inasmuch as it comes upon, initiates, and touches the gifted subject, its recipient, 
who, correspondingly, filters, receives and re-constitutes the phenomenon, effectively 
introducing the called for separation and distinction which lifts it from the faceless 
background and ex-poses it to visibility in the phenomenal realm (Marion 2002a, 124). 
Pictured in this ascent from elsewhere are both the initiating accomplishment of the 
phenomenon and the nature of the subject as gifted. The phenomenon still stands in 
relation to the subject, it still engages in a crossing with him or her, but it is now one of 
disproportion rather than strict correspondence. The phenomenon comes as a difference 
without common measure, as an initiating and irrevocable excess which founds time and 
again, and thus leaves or, better, gives the subject his stake as gifted, exposed and open to 
the world by feeling, by touch rather than sight, and by the tremors and generous 
abandonment of receptivity rather than the ecstasies of knowledge. 
With the subject consisting essentially in receptivity, in being ex-posed to an 
elsewhere rather than posing himself to himself as being his own activity, or of 
recuperating himself in a superior, one might say, authentic moment, the subject stands as 
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an exposition, and not as an appropriation or gathering. Prior to the relation of identity, 
the subject is exposed to exposure, to a dis-appropriation that renounces centrality and 
begins to wonder at the edges of presence, to tum its head and to wait, to look here and 
there for the position from which he will be open and exposed to the phenomenon from 
elsewhere as it bears itself forth. 
This process of arising from the depths, from an elsewhere more inward to the 
phenomenon than the phenomenon itself, according to which the phenomenon moves 
"from that which goes its own way (for a vague, unfocused gaze) to that which comes in 
its own way (of what shows itself)", we call ana-morphosis (Marion 2002a, 124). As this 
elsewhere does not act as an exterior condition, which would only serve to conserve it in 
being, but as an internal property, thus sufficient onto itself in the accomplishment of its 
appearance, the phenomenon arrives of its own accord, at a stroke, without the aid of a 
cause, past, history, or condition of any kind, and thus without continuity or warning. 
Bereft of external guarantee, and owing its appearance to itself alone, Marion 
defines this happening of the phenomenon, this upsurge into appearance, as a 
contingency. Here he follows Husser!, who notes that every "individual being of every 
sort is, quite universally speaking, contingent" (Husser! 1998, 7). Let us first 
acknowledge, however, that contingency is not here defined in contradistinction to 
necessity. Anterior to the binary between contingency and necessity, whereby the former, 
lacking sufficient reason, might just as well have been otherwise, and the latter, as the 
corresponding result of such reason(s), could only have been as it was, is a more 
primordial contingency, one that pushes beyond the binary of knowledge or non-
knowledge, necessity or non-necessity, and is unsurpassable and, ultimately, 
individuating. 
Contingency is the rule for all phenomena, and not only those which in some way 
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constitute an exception, owing to the nature of the spatial-temporal order: th(( continuum 
here in question is marked as an endless circulation, devoid of fixed points or duration. 
Inscribed in such an order, a phenomenon is ceaselessly displaced, arriving constantly but 
never wholly, in a succession of sketches, partial and, as a matter of course, unique 
(Marion 2002a, 126). A phenomenon, spread across space and time, is thus always 
divided from itself, never wholly present or complete, and, as a result, unable to be 
encompassed, comprehended, or otherwise gauged in its necessity by any finite 
hermeneutic. Contingency is therefore not a second-order but first-order property of 
phenomena. 
When, to choose but one example, Aristotle points out that a "sea-fight must either 
take place to-morrow or not" (Aristotle 2001, 48), we may therefore note that this 
necessity is itself necessarily based on the coming day, tomorrow, which is ruled by the 
temporal flux, and, by extension, the unique, unpredictable uprising, in short, the 
phenomenon as event, steeped in primordial contingency. All events, whether necessary 
or contingent, are thus based on their arrival, on their unpredictable landing. The divide 
between necessity and contingency, in tum, is not one of kind, but of degree: as Marion 
notes, "the reputedly necessary phenomena are distinguished from the contingent ones by 
the fact that they arrive more often, regularly, and by design than do the contingent ones" 
(Marion 2002a, 132). 
Since contingency is ultimately a matter of arrival, of the frequency of what, owing 
to its coming from elsewhere, we refer to as the phenomenon's unpredictable landing, 
moreover, it cannot be explained away as the simple, and only temporary, absence of 
sufficient reason, which, accordingly, with its inevitable arrival, would allow the 
contingent phenomenon to be "summed up by an extrinsic relation of the known to the 
knower" (Marion 2002a, 134). For the phenomenon, regardless of its frequency, in order 
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to truly arrive, must, in coming from itself by itself, without external conditions, and 
individuated in the spatial-temporal order, never to come again, always be first on the 
scene, as a pure and simple fact, which itself inaugurates what may come -- recognition, 
causes, identity, knowledge, and so on. 
4.2- Facticity and Factuality in Heidegger and Beyond 
The contingent phenomenon comes as the first fact, under the mode of facti city, not 
effectivity, which would presuppose an antecedent, a cause or condition (Marion 2002, 
140). Yet let us note that the facticity of contingent phenomena is not wholly equivalent 
to a brute fact. Heidegger, for one, argues that facticity cannot be extended to 
phenomenon in the least; that it is a trait specific to Dasein, to its manner of being: 
"Facti city is not the factuality of the factum brutum [of something present-at-hand], but a 
characteristic of Dasein's Being-- one that has been taken up into existence, even if it has 
been thrust aside. The 'that-it-is' of facti city never becomes something that we can come 
across by beholding it" (Heidegger 1996, 174). An inanimate object, for instance, does 
not, as in the case ofDasein, fmd itself thrown into question; it is not an issue for itself, 
and does not, consequently, project and await itself in the future. To the contrary, it 
simply is, there in the world, as a brute fact. It would thus seem as though facticity 
cannot encompass all phenomena; that, instead, it is the stuff of Dasein, and of Dasein 
alone. 
Heidegger continues to state, however, that "the concept of 'facti city' implies that an 
entity 'within-the-world' has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself 
as bound up in its 'destiny' with the Being of those entities that it encounters within its 
own world" (Heidegger 1996, 82). Identified with Dasein, more specifically, with its 
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being-in-the-world, which consists as a mode of opening, as Marion notes, facti city "is 
first exposed as such in the encounter with phenomena that are not of its mode of Being" 
(Marion 2002a, 145). Facticity, although not without a form specific to Dasein, neither 
begins nor ends with Dasein; it opens with, and is structured according to, the encounter, 
wherein, on the one hand, Dasein comes into its own inasmuch as it is exposed to and 
receives the given phenomenon, and on the other, the phenomenon impresses itself on the 
former and, through it, achieves its visibility (Marion 2002a, 146). Both Dasein and, 
inasmuch as it impacts on the former, the given phenomenon, as distinct and yet mutually 
informing elements in this encounter, this opening of a world, are thus ordered by 
facti city. 
It is from within, and on account of this being-in-the-world ofDasein, and not some 
ideological contention, that the relation between facticity and factuality assumes this new 
structure. It is not the case, moreover, that this alteration nullifies the individual outright: 
Dasein retains its particularity as the 'unto whom' of phenomena, as that to which 
phenomena must happen if they are to appear, however, since the latter's arrival -- their 
being truly given, in the sense previously discussed with respect to the gift-- is admitted 
as the onset of facti city, of Dasein's being-in-the-world, their factuality takes on a new 
character and significance: they are no longer brute facts, simply there for the aims and 
intentions of others, but instead themselves take the initiative that is their own appearing, 
which opens a field of possibilities, which forges specific demands on its respective 
recipients, and makes of man not a fact but a fact for yet another fact, for that original 
impression or elsewhere whose giving of it-self gives man his own self and initiates him 
into temporality, as late and already caught up in the events unpredictable landing. 
The necessary shift wrought by this move, in tum, is that Dasein does not ever take 
over the roles and possibilities of that in which it is always already in; it does not 
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appropriate them in view of a self-constancy, a mineness, an authenticity; rather, it allows 
itself to be caught up, to be receptive, not in a servile passivity, but in an acknowledgment 
of one's ownness as beyond appropriation, as a drawing out of and thus into oneself, into 
a self that is not mine-- I made myselfl --but that is given, gifted 'to me', where one's 
inauthenticity, rather than one's authenticity, enables one to re-constitute and, perhaps, 
offer gifts of oneself (Marion 2002a, 132). It is the inauthentic subject that, in 
abandoning the appropriation and distinct identity which Heidegger, in his approach to 
Being, ultimately favors, is able to fully partake in a sense of self through abandonment 
and exposure, through an exposure that is not a complete loss, but a reception of self 
through self-dispossession, and, correspondingly, through a radical sharing of the world, a 
being-with that is not haunted by the solitary, even oppositional, accents implied in 
Heidegger's emphasis on appropriation and the distinct raising of identity. 
As a part of this structure Dasein opens and receives itself in receiving the phenomenon 
as it gives itself from itself, and thus in shifting perspectives, growing "curious, available, 
enacted", such that it may fmd "the unique point of view from which the second level 
form will appear" (Marion 2002a, 124). The self owes itself, in other words, not to its 
autoarchy, to the security of its enclosure, nor to its status as transcendental origin, but to 
a devastation that is not so much a destruction as a destining, to a cogitation that is not so 
much an understanding as an exposure and affectation. 
The necessary shift wrought by this move, in tum, is that Dasein does not ever take 
over the roles and possibilities of that in which it is always already in; it does not 
appropriate them in view of a self-constancy, a mineness, an authenticity; rather, it allows 
itself to be caught up, to be receptive, not in a servile passivity, but in an acknowledgment 
of one's ownness as beyond appropriation, as a drawing out of and thus into oneself, into 
a self that is not mine-- I made myselfl --but that is given, gifted 'to me', where one's 
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inauthenticity, rather than one's authenticity, enables one to re-constitute and, perhaps, 
offer gifts of oneself (Marion 2002a, 132). Dasein opens and receives itself in receiving 
the phenomenon as it gives itself from itself, and thus in shifting perspectives, growing 
"curious, available, enacted", such that it may find "the unique point of view from which 
the second level form will appear" (Marion 2002a, 124). The self owes itself, in other 
words, not to its autoarchy, to the security of its enclosure, nor to its status as 
transcendental origin, but to a devastation that is not so much a destruction as a destining, 
to a cogitation that is not so much an understanding as an exposure and affectation. 
The conditions for the possibility of phenomenality are thus inverted: appearance no 
longer arises from the centrifugal intentionality of the constituting I, from a freedom one 
possesses, from capacities one contains, owns, and deploys at will, but from the counter-
intentionality of the given phenomenon, whose unforeseeable excess, whose 'anarchistic 
inspiration', to use Levinas' term, puts one in place, more specifically, in a freedom that, 
rather than being possessed, is shared, not on account of a banal fusion, a lukewarm 
altruism, but through a thought, and a thinking, that is susceptible to surprise and which, 
determining as much as it is itself determined, allows the given to inscribe itself. If, as 
Heidegger states, love serves as the "basic motive for phenomenological understanding", 
then, in light of these developments, it is a love that is not simply offered in the repetition 
of our pre-understanding of Being on a higher, more primordial, and ontologically 
authentic level, but in an opening outside the authority of this actuality, this field of 
objects and beings, toward an indefinite and never-present possibility that unnerves and 
holds me forever (Heidegger 1982, 185). 
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4.3- lflty Take Leave o/rhe Horizon o/Oijec/ness and .Beingness? 
Yet Janicaud again questions the need, and even the viability, of going to such 
lengths, of abandoning, or at least seriously displacing, subjectivity so as to be open to the 
excess of the given phenomenon. When canvassing Levinas, the forbearer of this move 
outside the horizon of objectness and beingness, he notes how Husser} and Descartes 
"discover also that my subjectivity exceeds the representation I have of it. There is no 
need, then, to introduce the Other [Autre] face to the Same, nor to claim, as Levinas does, 
that the idea of the infinite is "the non-adequation par excellence" (Janicaud 2000, 38-39). 
Put differently, if the subject simultaneously maintains and surpasses itself, to the extent 
that it is present to and participates in the beyond-measure, the excess of intuition in 
experience; in short, if the subject becomes what it is by traversing the infinite, by 
forming a dialectic with it, and thus relaying back to itself all of the sense, significance, 
and assurance it requires, then this radical exteriority is at best superfluous, and at worst a 
personal obsession. 
Let us first note, however, that it is somewhat strange of Janicaud to put forward a 
refutation of Levinas' Other, of the idea of infinity, by referencing Descartes' views on the 
matter: Levinas himself employs these very views as a starting point, distancing himself 
from them only in the following respect: whereas the idea of infinity in Descartes 
eventually serves in the attainment of certainty for all that thought holds clear and distinct 
-- the world, the self, and others -- Levinas regards it as throwing the certainty of the self 
into question (Levinas 1969, 192-193, 197-200). The idea of infinity, which comes upon 
us in the face of the Other, does not ground or otherwise ensure the enclosure of the self 
but, to the contrary, wrenches it out of its self-satisfying melody and urges it to recognize 
in the Other a claim that has a right over its egoism. The idea of infinity does not lead to 
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certainty but substitution, not knowledge but, if we may say so, love (Levinas 1969, 215-
216). 
This difference does indeed make all the difference: in seizing upon the Other as 
diachronic, as interruption rather than reinforcement of one's egoism, Levinas purports to 
provide the individual with the assurance proper to its self and its continued existence. 
For the alterity of the Other is not simply a trauma, but a source of freedom and joy, 
inasmuch as it wrestles one from the autism of the self, not to mention the incessant drone 
of being, and awakens in it a desire for the heights, a desire, importantly, that is not bent 
on coveting, and is not thereby burdened by the humdrum oflack and repletion, but 
instead thrives on its own hunger, growing more fervent the closer one approaches the 
inapproachable, the more one partakes in "a relation without relation", that is to say, the 
more one welcomes the Other in its radical alterity (Levinas 1969, 34, 80). In this way, 
the Other, conceived in its radical alterity, gives the individual its inspiration, its reason 
for continuing with life. 
Can the same be said of the certainty that issues from Descartes' conception of the 
idea of infinity? (Descartes 1985, 35-39, 45-48) Our answer here must be in the negative. 
For, frankly, what do I care if my existence is certain and indubitable? The gift of 
certainty is no gift at all; its light does not surprise or embolden, but fails to touch me in 
the least. Still, let us conjure up this argument once more. As we well know, even if the 
ego is deceived or otherwise mistaken, each moment's thought implies an act and thus 
attests to one's subsistence, to the fact that I am. Much as the object's certainty is 
maintained insofar as I continue to think of it, the certainty of the I remains intact only so 
long as it calls itself to mind. As Marion thus notes: 
Everything thus depends on what I cogitate -- on my thinking will. I am because I 
can doubt objects and because I am still thinking while willing to doubt; in short, I 
am certain because I am quite willing. But can't I also not will it? And am .I certain 
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always to will it again? Seeing as it comes down to a pure decision of the cogitatio, 
could I not always retort, 'What's the use?' in front of the possibility of producing 
my own certainty ofbeing? (Marion 2003, 18) 
Given that, as Marion continues, I exist before and outside of the world of objects, 
inaugurating their world only to leave it and live elsewhere, the certainty peculiar to them 
leaves me cold indeed (Marion 2003, 17). What is most essential to me exists elsewhere, 
outside of certainty, which is why that, "once I am certain to exist.. . .! can [then] truly 
doubt myself' (Marion 2003, 15). That is to say, with the certainty of my existence well 
and truly established, I can then doubt my abilities, the quality of my life, my future 
possibilities, all of which strike me more deeply than the certainty of my actuality ever 
could (Marion 2003, 15-16). To go yet further, does not Being suffer the same difficulty? 
Being, for Heidegger, generates meaning of its own generosity, and calls for Dasein 
only as its mouthpiece, as that through which its most essential possibility, that of its 
finitude, is fully brought to light. But why should the individual, whose being is at issue 
for it, wish to persevere in being? In posing this question, as so many do in everyday life, 
and with no small vehemence, we continue on from Levinas in his insistence that, contra 
Heidegger and Sartre, it is not the nothingness of reality that spurs on nausea, but the 
oppressive, indeed boring, self-reflexivity of Being itself (Levinas 2003, 34, 68). At the 
heart of affectivity, then, is not anxiety for one's nothingness, but the Other which brings 
hope, which short-circuits this self-reflexivity, and leads one outside mere service and 
perseverance, towards an open future. 
Although this assertion is often regarded by detractors as a mere intuition on 
Levinas' part, it is in fact situated well within the history of philosophy: as we know, Kant 
upheld that philosophy is essentially comprised of four key questions: 1) What can I 
know? 2) What should I do? 3) What may I reasonably hope for? and 4) What is a human 
being? (Kant 1988, 25) 
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In response to the third question, the a priori hope which could be upheld, which, 
indeed, could not but be upheld by finite reason, though it itself transcended finitude, was 
the harmony of virtue and happiness. It was on account of this hope, and not because of 
Being itself, that one continued to subsist in being (Levinas 2000, 59-61). The Other in 
its radical alterity serves just a function for Levinas, as does love and the phenomenon 
come from elsewhere in Marion. 
In extending Levinas' argument, Marion asserts that one overcomes indifference, 
and effectively deals with the ennui ofbeing, in exposing oneself to this radical alterity 
and welcoming, or, in Marion's terms, loving outside reciprocity, certainty, limit, or even 
the guarantee of subsistence in being (Marion 2003, 70-71). In admitting this possibility, 
this love without reserve, which thereby admits that its act may not meet with a 
corresponding re-action, which in fact is accomplished all the better in its absence, the 
ego is assured of itself as lover in and through its "love without being" (Marion 2003, 71-
72). It is only on account of this possibility, this exposure and welcoming of an 
indeterminate other, and not the various aspects of my actuality -- the tasks I complete, 
the acquaintances that surround me every day -- that the ego feels assured enough to carry 
on with existence. Through an opening to the radical alterity of the given, outside 
certainty, self-reflexivity, and general economy, love takes on what for it is the otherwise 
unobtainable significance of a theoretical concept. Bearing this in mind, the idea of 
infinity proffered by Levinas, and continued in Marion, stands well apart from that of 
Descartes, whose assurance, whether on the level of objectness or beingness, only 
threatens the integrity of the entity it is meant to safeguard. 
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Chapter 5- Consequences if Saturated Phenomena 
5.1- Without Why 
This critique of the need for an elsewhere considered outside the horizon of the 
object and of being having been laid to rest, we may now rightfully move forward in 
laying out the implications of the saturated phenomenon that gives itself from itself. If 
the phenomenon arrives at a stroke, from itself and by itself, as an incident whose coming 
inaugurates and partakes in the facti city of the individual self by pressing itself onto it, 
then the latter's search for causes which might account for the incident's upsurge into 
phenomenality is something of an ineffectual endeavor. The phenomenon is always 
already there, or at any rate, already coming, advancing, garnering attention not in 
anticipation, but in a surprise, however dim, which ensnares and enraptures. The 
phenomenon thus not only has no need of any exterior condition, a cause, if you like, in 
order to achieve its appearance, but, coming in this way as it does, we can begin to see 
how the call for causes issues not from some beneficent desire to fully come to terms with 
the event, but out of a base fear of its impact, out of a desire to lighten it, to alter the 
power relation. 
Leading this charge, Descartes makes the following declaration: "Now it is manifest 
by the natural light that there must be at least as much reality in the efficient and total 
cause as in the effect of that cause. For where, I ask, could the effect get its reality from, 
if not from the cause? And how could the cause give it to the effect unless it possessed 
it?" (Descartes 1985, 28). Marion points out, however, that the efficient cause of an event 
does not itself suffice to account for its happening (Marion 2002a, 163). Even were an 
efficient cause to be cropped out and rendered discernible in its effectiveness apart from 
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all the others, which is highly questionable, 
other factors, provisionally negligible or unknown, of an indeterminate number but 
always required, can also interfere. In particular, the privilege brutally accorded to 
efficiency (here called total-- sole sufficient) hides the residual function of the final 
cause, the material cause-- not only the material (which can still on principle be 
perfectly known), but the indeterminate factor (hule), the work that can make the 
material play, deforms it in opposition to the form and admits conforming only to a 
fmal deformity (Marion 2002a, 163). 
Just as the giver cannot foresee the nature of the gift he makes, much less how it 
will tum out or be received by its recipient, with the invariable involvement of such 
indeterminate factors in the springing forth of an effect, if an effect it be, the cause(s) of 
the effect are equally blind to the effects they produce, to the extent that it is no longer 
proper to say they have produced them as such. On account of these unforeseeable 
effects involved in the produced effect, without which the latter cannot be fully 
determined, we may say that "the effect contains always as much, often more, reality 
(possibly dangerous or negative) as the cause" (Marion 2002a, 163). All this becomes 
that much more problematic once we consider that the validity of Descartes' claim -- that 
the effect is wholly owing to its cause-- rests on the possibility that cause and effect 
themselves rest together in space and time. Unless this is the case, such a comparative 
analysis cannot be justifiably undertaken (Marion 2002a, 163-164). Insofar as time 
continues unabated, the coming of the effect spells disappearance for its so-called cause. 
For we've shown how the phenomenon, in order to truly give itself, must do so from 
itself, surging up into phenomenality, thereby standing as an addition to it, unlike causes 
which, to exist as such, must already be there in reality, stable, treading water, so as to be 
readily available and thus discernible to the naked eye (Marion 2002a, 164 ). 
We have noted that phenomena outstrip what might be considered their causes 
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owing to the indeterminate factors always involved in their rise to phenomenality, but let 
us also not go without discussing the positive dimension influencing this ascent. It is also 
the over-determination of the saturated phenomenon that renders unsuccessful any search 
for causes. Take the Second World War. The difficulty involved in assigning its events 
stable causes lies not in the indeterminacy of the situation, in the lack of information or 
knowledge, but in the fact that there is too much information (Marion 2002a, 168). 
No one will be surprised if we say that events such as the Second World War are so 
bloated with details that the assignation of causes to their incidents is simply impossible. 
But the same can also be said of more ordinary ongoings: I am walking outside and turn a 
comer, I look down the street at the row of houses and suddenly find myself swamped by 
a sensation as inexplicable as it is undeniable; a hazy warmth that loosens and delights at 
once. As basic and apparent as the situation is, it ushers forth an excess which surprises 
and forces itself upon me, rendering me unable to determine its causes. The everyday 
happening, much like the large-scale event, in initiating itself and us, its recipient, into its 
phenomenality, its order, thus escapes causes and foresight. Besides, what would be the 
result of a world of events wedded to causes? When we consider that events so often 
bound to an inordinate number of causes, WWII for example, often leave one doubting 
their very reality, the answer seems clear: a world of simulacra. Events are so often today 
pinned to causes that their sheer factuality, their all too obvious presence and truth, 
inverts into its opposite, into sheer unreality. Far from feeling more certain or 
comfortable with these certain phenomena, we are often left feeling cold before them, 
wondering if reality hasn't perhaps always been a matter of simulacra, taken apart and 
reassembled at will. 
However paradoxically, it is those events that are not seen, that do not form a clear 
and distinct object made plainly available to the gaze that, in their very im-possibility, 
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resonate and leave lasting, if incomplete, impressions which, for precisely that reason, 
bring people outside themselves and "render[ s] communication possible" (Marion, 2002a, 
229). This saturation comes forward, as we have just seen, through the excess of 
quantity, through the plurality of horizons and the wealth of information spawned therein; 
but it also occurs through the idol, that is, according to quality, the exorbitant intuition 
interrupts and exposes it to itself as an extremity that is not an essence, but the place 
where no essence is possible, and where the subject comes toward itself in coming 
outside itself, in shifting perspectives, angles, and approaches to the work that bears it 
forward, that gives it to itself as gifted. 
We have witnessed this form of saturation in the painting, but we might in this 
moment also note, anticipating later developments, that saturation knows two further 
forms: that of the flesh and the icon. The former, in short, is saturated in that it is 
unrestrained and unconditional, an immediate and originary manifestation of the subject 
as an affectivity affecting itself in and by itself. Finally, there is the icon, the counter-
intentional gaze of the Other, in whose silent stare, which is felt, undergone, yet never 
rendered plainly visible, there is concentrated the saturation of each of the three previous 
stages, that of quantity, quality, and what we will call immediacy (Marion, 2002a, 233). 
Heightening and bringing together all four of the aforementioned modalities of saturation, 
and in turn exposing the extremity of phenomenality, as possibility liberated from all 
worldly determination, given inasmuch as given, and therefore without any reserve or 
remainder, is saturation taken to the second degree in the paradox of paradoxes, that of 
revelation, which is exemplified, at least for Marion, in the coming of Christ. Here we 
acknowledge that there are in fact subtleties of gradation where givenness is concerned 
(Marion, 2002a, 234). Revelation indicates and inscribes itself at the edges of 
phenomenality but never crosses or annihilates it as such; at its extremity and effectivity, 
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rather, it manifests that its possibility, even, or rather especially, in its impossibility, fully 
achieves all dimensions of phenomenality according to givenness. 
5.2 -Saturation and the Sphere of Art 
Phenomena thus stand over and above the knowledge we can have of them. 
Traditionally, when this is recognized as being the case, it is owing to the deficiency of 
the phenomena in question. For Kant, fortifying this tradition, states that a phenomenon 
is only possible when it agrees "with the formal conditions of experience, that is, with the 
conditions of intuition and of concepts" (Kant 2008, 239). Put differently, a phenomenon 
does not give itself from itself, imposing itself on man, but in meeting a condition exterior 
to itself, in complying with man's capacity for knowledge (Marion 2002a, 182). Since the 
phenomenon must look elsewhere for its possibility, since it is deficient in this respect, its 
appearance no longer attests to its givenness but to the principle of sufficient reason, 
which, as we've seen, states "that nothing happens without its being possible for one who 
has enough knowledge of things to give a reason sufficient to determine why it is thus and 
not otherwise" (Leibniz 1973, 199). 
The privileging of the intellect over the phenomenon implied in this supposition 
looms large in the history of philosophy. Husserl, for one, also states that a "surplus in 
meaning remains" since "the realm of meaning is much wider than that of intuition" 
(Husserl1970, 775). Yet the principle of all principles, as we now well know, puts 
intuition forward as a "source of right for knowledge", that is, so long as it itself comes 
forward as origin, as originary, so that the limits within which it appears are its own and 
nothing else besides (Husserl 1998, 44). We must therefore search for the conditions, if 
any, under which it would be possible for an intuition to give itself originarily. 
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For as we've shown, following the principle of all principles, the giving intuition, to 
achieve phenomenality, cannot simply come, but must come 'to us' (Husserl 1998, 44). 
To enable the intuition to be given originarily, the I to which it is given can no longer be 
considered as constituting agent, but as we've already implied, as recipient, as gifted 
rather than giver. The I -- or, better, the 'me' -- would here no longer serve as a condition 
but as a necessary component in the phenomenon's ascent to phenomenality. Let it not be 
said, however, as Janicaud and other detractors have, that only religious or otherwise 
spiritual phenomena call for such a relation. Marion himself, as we've seen, puts forward 
the painting as the visible par excellence. It falls to us to continue with this and suggest 
that the givenness of the phenomena is best reached in the light of the sphere of art. For 
Kant, the idea assumes two forms: 1) that of reason, whereby the mind's representation 
unfolds in line with its capacity for knowledge, and 2) that of the aesthetics, whereby the 
representation unfolds in line with the imagination provoked by the excess of intuition. 
Kant states that "the representation of the imagination ... occasions much thinking 
though without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e. concept, to be adequate 
to it" (Kant 1978, 218). An idea ofthe sublime, which "no language fully attains or 
makes intelligible" (Kant 1978, 192), owes this not to the poverty of its intuition, which 
would need the intention of the constituting agent to bring it to the clear light of day, but 
to its saturation, to the fact that it is more present than the present, so that its presence 
overflows the present and cannot be ensnared therein. 
It is against the background of this insight that we should understand Marion's 
conception of the saturated phenomenon. As with the artwork, whose manner of creation 
and ensuing result escapes all forms of foresight and complete comprehension, the 
saturated phenomenon, however ordinary, does not allow itself to be situated in a network 
of causes and effects; its components, excessive and unforeseeable in number, frustrate 
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expectation, and exceed the minds power of knowledge (Marion 2002, 206). The 
saturated phenomenon thus exceeds the horizon as limiting or otherwise constituting 
factor, however, in keeping with this tradition of the artwork, it doesn't annul the horizon 
altogether (Marion 2002, 209). Put differently, this re-conception of the horizon does not 
result in an "anything goes", but, instead, just as the elements and effects of a 
phenomenon are many and excessive, it necessitates that the horizons through which it 
comes into play are many, shifting, and always incomplete (Marion 2002, 210). It is, in 
part, on account of this shifting, irregular nature of the horizons that the saturated 
phenomenon so brilliantly achieves its phenomenality and ensnares our attention. As a 
result, "the bedazzlement it provokes would become phenomenologically acceptable, 
indeed desirable, and the passage from one horizon to another would become a rational 
task for the [endless] hermeneutic" (Marion 2002a, 211 ). 
5.3- The Pure Form ofthe Call 
The characteristics of the saturated phenomena before us, we will now look to see 
how the phenomena, in the pure form of the call, affords the self as gifted its unique 
identity and opening to the future. We have seen how the certainty of the subject 
traditionally conceived fails to furnish it with assurance to go on. The ego holds itself 
before itself and remains certain of its existence in the mode of an object so long as it 
remains there in thought, but why should it bother to continue holding itself there, 
especially given that, more often than not, it exists elsewhere, outside the realm of 
objects? And, besides, where is this subject left if not in a tautology (I=I), an autism, an 
all too comfortable bachelorhood? To enable the call of the saturated phenomenon to 
engage the self in terms other than those of a stultifying possession, whether in "the 
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nominative case (intending the object-- Husserl)" or "in the genitive (of Being--
Heidegger)", we will focus on it outside such delimited horizons, in its original, 
indeterminate essence, "in the terms of the dative: I receive my self from the call that 
gives me to myself before giving me anything whatsoever" (Marion 2002a, 269). 
The chief objection raised against such a call consists in the fact that, if the call of 
the saturated phenomenon not only comes forth wholly of its own initiative, but also 
gives the self to itself, without itself calling for any intentional fulfillment, won't it be 
wholly empty, and, what is more, wouldn't an empty call by principle fall by the wayside? 
(Marion 2002a, 283) We will address this objection, in keeping with Marion, by showing 
how the call is first heard in the response. The first, and perhaps finest, example of a call 
illuminated in the response is that which is demonstrated in Caravaggio's, The Calling of 
Saint Matthew. A darkened room with daylight casting diagonal lines down upon five 
individuals huddled together over a wooden table as though for warmth. The two farthest 
on the left have their sights set of the coins strewn about the table while the two on the 
opposing end gaze calmly, vaguely, out in the general direction of the two figures 
standing hunched in the shadows. One, with his back turned to us the viewers, motions 
indistinctly to the figure perched on the far right of the table, while the other of the two, 
Christ, extends his arm further out in the general direction of those at the table, to which 
Matthew, sitting in the middle of all of them, inquisitively, and with some alarm, gestures 
at himself with his hand, as though asking, "me? is this for me?" (Marion 2002a, 285). 
Christ's arm, extended to all, in a pointed yet indeterminate gesture, shakes loose 
and individualizes Matthew's attention, and in so doing, receives some manner of 
determination itself (Marion 2002a, 284-285). We thus alight upon and hear the 
otherwise inaudible call of Christ in Matthew's animated expression, in his response, 
without which the call would come to nothing. In this sense, with the call coming to 
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phenomenality, and thus to audibility, only in the response wrung from the self as gifted, 
before even being said, it is heard (Marion 2002a, 288). Paradoxical as this may seem, if 
there is to be any question of an appearing deserving of the name, how could it be 
otherwise? Were one to plainly hear, see, or otherwise anticipate that to which one is 
responding, then one would already stand in relation of adequation with the present 
phenomena, which would thereby reflect and confirm its intention, and return the self to 
its roundabout copulation with itself (I=I). 
If the call is to retain the saturation proper to what initiates its ascent into 
phenomenality, then it must continue to spur on surprise, that is to say, it must bring the 
self out into an exteriority and ask it to recognize its very self as issuing from there, in 
lending a degree of determination to the indeterminable, in saying (though never once and 
for all) what cannot be said, in naming without knowing that which is named, and thus in 
continuing to write, to philosophize, even -- or, perhaps, especially -- here where the 
matter at hand does not immediately lend itself to themetization or representation. 
Though the saturated phenomenon may thus flirt with the limit of philosophy, it is a limit 
that is at the same time its source, its wellspring, past and future. 
For although there may here be temptation to view the nature of this call as an 
attempt to deflect phenomenology toward decidedly religious terrain, it in fact issues 
from a very basic and essential philosophical motivation. Philo-sophy, as a love of 
knowledge, does not first possess but rather desires knowledge. Urged by this desire, by 
this desire for a knowledge still unknown and other to it, far off and unseen, the 
philosopher, first and foremost, is open to the unexpected and is thus able to partake in a 
relation of reception rather than mere exchange. Similarly, the self as gifted, and never as 
constituting I, who, remnant of a dying bourgeois mentality, fears being seduced, and 
claims to see "without wanting and before wanting", acknowledges that "[in] order to see, 
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one must frrst want to see" (Marion 2002a, 305). 
Since this wanting (or desiring) precedes constitution, and thereby attests to the 
initiative of the given phenomenon, there is a delay intrinsic to the self as gifted (Marion 
2002, 289). The response always comes after the call, like one of Kafka's perennially late 
protagonists. The necessity of this structure is born out in the unfolding of day-to-day 
life: 
The gifted is late ever since his birth precisely because he is born; he is late from 
birth precisely because he must frrst be born. There are none among the living who 
did not first have to be born, that is to say, arise belatedly from his parents in the 
attentive circle of waiting for words that summoned him before he could understand 
them or guess their meaning (Marion 2002a, 289). 
Since one is always already behind the call, whose saturation frustrates any attempt 
at complete comprehension, the gifted accesses its own-most self only through 
inauthenticity, not authenticity, which implies "self-appropriation, without remainder or 
difference" (Marion 2002a, 290). The call is not fully tended to in a framework of 
correspondence, in the response adequately responds to the call, as though communing 
with it. The call is heard in the response, yes, but this is not to say that one is equal to the 
other; it is the excess of the call, and our inability to fully or completely respond and thus 
commune with it which necessitates a move outside this framework of correspondence, 
this authenticity, toward an inauthenticity, an incompletion that is not a fault but an active 
receptivity to the excess of the call and, in a knowing without or before knowledge, an 
acknowledgment of our relation to it as one of disproportion and incommensurability. 
Against this background, the justification for Marion's pure form of the call better 
betrays itself The call is pure, that is to say, anonymous, not so as to afford it an other-
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worldly tint, but so as to avoid giving it any manner of tint whatsoever. Only as 
anonymous, in excess of any name, or aggregate thereof, does the call abide by the logic 
of the gift (Marion 2002a, 297). As we've seen, only when the giver is suspended, 
rendered anonymous, so that there is no longer a determinate origin whose donation 
would thereby call for a reciprocal gesture, is the gift truly given, outside all such 
economy. Here the call is no different. 
Conclusion - Revelation and Phenomenology 
The phenomenon taken in its givenness has taken us outside the horizon of the 
object and of Being, toward the possibility that the phenomenon might give itself from 
itself. This possibility was most clearly evidenced in the painting as the more visible than 
visible, as the visible par excellence, which, quite apart from its backing materials, rose in 
its non-ontic coming-forward with an intuitive intensity heretofore inexperienced and 
shook the viewers gaze from its listless sliding upon this or that and employed it in the 
achievement of its own apparition. The basic model of this non-ontic coming-forward 
was then discovered in the gift. In contradistinction to J anicaud and Derrida, who upheld 
that the gift's possibility was its impossibility, that its necessary existence outside 
economy and presence rendered it null, we suggested that this presupposes that presence, 
knowledge, and identity hold a monopoly on appearance, and that, in bracketing the 
giver, the givee, and the gift itself, the gift could properly achieve its phenomenality. 
Indeed, all phenomena, even those of the most ordinary sort, arise according to this 
model. From whence issues an ana-morphosis: inasmuch as the phenomenon gives itself 
from itself, without need of an exterior condition or horizon outside itself, the self, though 
still the centre of phenomenality, as the lightening rod, the 'unto whom' on which 
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phenomenon must strike so as to ascend to their distinct phenomenality from within 
themselves, no longer initiates or dictates the identity or manner of unfolding of either 
itself or the phenomenon. The upsurge into phenomenality begins with the initiative of 
phenomena, which make a gift of themselves and, in so doing, gives the self to itself as 
gifted. Though Janicaud again interjects, questioning the need for this move outside the 
horizons of objectness and beingness in order to attain and support a subject in excess of 
its powers of representation, citing the examples ofHusserl and Descartes, this criticism 
falls short of its desired effectiveness: the certainty with which Descartes idea of infinity 
solidifies the subject all but mummifies it in a stupor unfit for its manner of activity. 
Caught in indifference, which asks, "Why bother?", a certainty hinging upon one's 
continued volition blinks and stands dumbfounded. Let the self shift to Dasein; let it 
acknowledge its nothingness and ask, "to be or not to be?" I can always, if only for spite, 
decide to end my being, and recover a higher dignity in suicide, rather than subsist and 
merely survive as a modality of Being, which precedes me and will continue long after 
my passing. Confronted with the face of indifference, Being is not enough for Being. 
Life lives-- rather than merely survives-- in the radical alterity of the Other, in the 
radical generosity of a love outside self-reflexivity, presence, and economy. 
And so we continue: following the principle of all principles, we propose a 
saturated phenomena which, in the light ofKant's conception of the sublime, spawns 
much thought since no single one can exhaust its intuitive intensity. The saturated 
phenomenon unfolds according to the logic of the call, whose anonymity mirrors that of 
the giver. Much as the giver must harbor no awareness of itself as giver in order to give 
with abandon and thus avoid seeing its act dissipate in the circuit of economy and 
calculation, the call must not achieve an identity or voice of its own before being given to 
and resounding in the response of the responsal. Anonymity thus protects the call from 
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being said, whether in this tradition or that, before it is properly heard, from being 
exchanged as commodity, religious or otherwise, before it is received as a possibility. 
The saturated phenomenon is thus rightly a call; and a call come from elsewhere, 
ultimately, is a matter of revelation. 
This revelation interests us conceptually, that is, as a possibility rather than 
actuality. Marion raises the figure of Christ in a similar manner: 
The coming, according to which he comes forward, defines him so essentially that it 
embraces him and precedes him -- he himself depends on it without determining it; 
and he arises from this eventfulness because it attests that he does not come forward 
from himself('! have not come of my own', John 8:43), but at the bidding of the 
Father ('You have sent me', John 17: 18:43) (Marion 2002, 237). 
Christ serves as a specific, and altogether fitting, example of revelation as the 
pinnacle or limit of the saturated phenomenon, of the saturated phenomenon taken to the 
second order. To the extent that even this revelation (Christ's coming) is only inasmuch 
as it is given, it does not suffice to shatter phenomenality, but unfolds within it, according 
to it. Christ himself is late, behind his own coming, in a relation of non-adequation to it, 
in-authentic, and for that he is aroused by wonder, for that he is vigilant: "Open your 
eyes, be vigilant, for you do not know when the moment will come" (Mark 13:33). 
Phenomenology itself abides by the given in acknowledging its own non-adequation to it, 
in not, for this reason, replacing it with what it will, but by engaging in an exposed 
thinking that renders its late-coming more agile and makes of this past its future. 
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